Abstract. In threshold cryptography, private keys are divided into n shares, each one of which is given to a different server in order to avoid single points of failure. In the case of threshold public-key encryption, at least t ≤ n servers need to contribute to the decryption process. A threshold primitive is said robust if no coalition of t malicious servers can prevent remaining honest servers from successfully completing private key operations. So far, most practical non-interactive threshold cryptosystems, where no interactive conversation is required among decryption servers, were only proved secure against static corruptions. In the adaptive corruption scenario (where the adversary can corrupt servers at any time, based on its complete view), all existing robust threshold encryption schemes that also resist chosenciphertext attacks (CCA) till recently require interaction in the decryption phase. A specific method (in composite order groups) for getting rid of interaction was recently suggested, leaving the question of more generic frameworks and constructions with better security and better flexibility (i.e., compatibility with distributed key generation). This paper describes a general construction of adaptively secure robust non-interactive threshold cryptosystems with chosen-ciphertext security. We define the notion of all-but-one perfectly sound threshold hash proof systems that can be seen as (threshold) hash proof systems with publicly verifiable and simulation-sound proofs. We show that this notion generically implies threshold cryptosystems combining the aforementioned properties. Then, we provide efficient instantiations under well-studied assumptions in bilinear groups (e.g., in such groups of prime order). These instantiations have a tighter security proof and are indeed compatible with distributed key generation protocols.
Introduction
Threshold cryptography [22, 23, 12] avoids single points of failure by splitting keys into n > 1 shares which are held by servers in such a way that at least t out of n servers should contribute to private key operations. In (t, n)-threshold cryptosystems, an adversary breaking into up to t − 1 servers should not jeopardize the security of the system.
Chosen-ciphertext security [45] (or IND-CCA for short) is widely recognized as the standard security notion for public-key encryption. Securely distributing the decryption procedure of CCAsecure public key schemes has proved to be a challenging task. As discussed in, e.g., [49, 25] , the difficulty is that decryption servers should return their partial decryption results, called "decryption shares", before knowing whether the incoming ciphertext is valid or not and partial decryptions of ill-formed ciphertexts may leak useful information to the adversary.
The first solution to this problem was put forth by Shoup and Gennaro [49] and it requires the random oracle model [5] , notably to render valid ciphertexts publicly recognizable. In the standard model, Canetti and Goldwasser [15] gave a threshold variant of the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme [16] . Unfortunately, their scheme requires interaction among decryption servers to obtain robustness (i.e., ensure that no coalition of t − 1 malicious servers can prevent uncorrupted servers from successfully decrypting) as well as to render invalid ciphertexts harmless. The approach of [15] consists in randomizing the decryption process in such a way that partial decryptions of invalid ciphertexts are uniformly random and thus meaningless to the adversary. To avoid the need to jointly generate randomizers at each decryption, shareholders can alternatively store a large number (i.e., proportional to the expected number of decryptions) of pre-shared secrets, which does not scale well. Cramer, Damgård and Ishai suggested [20] a method to generate randomizers without interaction but it is only efficient for a small number of servers.
Other threshold variants of Cramer-Shoup were suggested [1, 40] and Abe notably showed [1] how to achieve optimal resilience (namely, guarantee robustness as long as the adversary corrupts a minority of t < n/2 servers) in the Canetti-Goldwasser system [15] . In the last decade, generic constructions of CCA-secure threshold cryptosystems with static security were put forth [24, 52] .
Non-Interactive Schemes. As an application of the Canetti-Halevi-Katz (CHK) paradigm [18] , Boneh, Boyen and Halevi [8] came up with the first fully non-interactive robust CCA-secure threshold cryptosystem with a security proof in the standard model: in their scheme, decryption servers can generate their decryption shares without any communication with other servers. Their scheme takes advantage of bilinear maps to publicly check the validity of ciphertexts, which considerably simplifies the task of proving security in the threshold setting. In addition, the validity of decryption shares can be verified in the same way, which provides robustness. Similar applications of the CHK methodology to threshold cryptography were studied in [13, 36] .
Recently, Wee [52] defined a framework allowing to construct non-interactive threshold signatures and (chosen-ciphertext secure) threshold cryptosystems in a static corruption model. He left as an open problem the extension of his framework in the scenario of adaptive corruptions.
Adaptive Corruptions. Most threshold systems (including [49, 15, 24, 25, 8] ) have been analyzed in a static corruption model, where the adversary chooses which servers it wants to corrupt before the scheme is set up. Unfortunately, adaptive adversaries -who can choose whom to corrupt at any time, as a function of their entire view of the protocol execution -are known (see, e.g., [19] ) to be strictly stronger. As discussed in [15] , properly dealing with adaptive corruptions often comes at some substantial expense like a lower resilience. For example, the Canetti-Goldwasser system can be proved robust and adaptively secure when the threshold t is sufficiently small (typically, when t = O(n 1/2 )) but supporting an optimal number of faulty servers is clearly preferable.
Assuming reliable erasures, Canetti et al. [14] devised adaptively secure protocols for the distributed generation of discrete-logarithm-based keys and DSA signatures. Their techniques were re-used later on [3] in proactive [44] RSA signatures. In 1999, Frankel, MacKenzie and Yung [26, 27] independently showed different methods to achieve adaptive security in the erasure-enabled setting.
Subsequently, Jarecki and Lysyanskaya [34] eliminated the need for erasures and gave an adaptively secure variant of the Canetti-Goldwasser threshold cryptosystem [15] which appeals to interactive zero-knowledge proofs but is designed to remain secure in concurrent environments. Unfortunately, their scheme requires a fair amount of interaction among decryption servers. Abe and Fehr [2] showed how to dispense with zero-knowledge proofs in the Jarecki-Lysyanskaya construction so as to prove it secure in (a variant of) the universal composability framework but without completely eliminating interaction from the decryption procedure. As in most threshold variants of Cramer-Shoup, hedging against invalid decryption queries requires an interactive (though off-line) randomness generation phase for each ciphertext, unless many pre-shared secrets are stored.
Recently, the authors of this paper showed [39] an adaptively secure variant of the BonehBoyen-Halevi construction [8] using groups of composite order and the dual system encryption approach [50, 38] that was initially applied to identity-based encryption [48, 10] . The scheme of [39] is based on a very specific use of the Lewko-Waters techniques [38] , which limits its applicability to composite order groups and makes it hard to combine with existing adaptively secure distributed key generation techniques. Also, the concrete security of this initial scheme is not optimal as its security reduction is related to the number of decryption queries made by the adversary. To solve these problems, we need a new approach and different methods to analyze the security of schemes.
Our contribution.
Motivated by an open question raised by Wee [52] and the limitations of [39] , we define a general framework for constructing robust, adaptively secure and fully non-interactive threshold cryptosystems with chosen-ciphertext security. Our goal is to have simple and practical client/server protocols, as advocated in [49] [Section 2.5], and even avoid the off-line interactive randomness generation stage which is usually needed in threshold versions of Cramer-Shoup.
To this end, we also appeal to hash proof systems (HPS) [17] and take advantage of the property that, in security reductions using the techniques of [16, 17] , the simulator knows the private keys, which is convenient to answer adaptive corruption queries. Indeed, when the reduction has to reveal the internal state of dynamically-corrupted servers, it is not bound to a particular set of available shares since it knows them all. At the same time, we depart from [15] in that the validity of ciphertexts is made publicly verifiable -which eliminates the need to randomize the decryption operation -using non-interactive proofs satisfying some form of simulation-soundness [46] : in the security reduction, the simulator should be able to generate a proof for a possibly false statement but the adversary should be unable to do it on its own, even after having seen a fake proof.
To this end, we define the notion of all-but-one perfectly sound threshold hash proof systems that can be seen as (threshold) hash proof systems [17] with publicly verifiable proofs (as opposed to designed-verifier proofs used in traditional HPS [17] ). More precisely, each proof is associated with a tag, in the same way as ciphertexts are associated with tags in [41, 36] . Real public parameters are indistinguishable from alternative parameters that are generated in an all-but-one mode, which is only used in the security analysis. In the latter mode, non-interactive proofs are perfectly sound on all tags, except for a single specific tag where some trapdoor makes it possible to simulate proofs for false statements. While our primitive bears similarities with Wee's extractable hash proof systems [51, 52] (where hash proof systems are also associated with tags), it is different in that no extractability property is required and proofs are always used as proofs of membership.
Using all-but-one perfectly sound threshold hash proof systems, we generically construct adaptively secure robust non-interactive threshold cryptosystems with optimal resilience. An additional benefit of this approach is to provide a better concrete security as the security proof requires a constant number of game transitions whereas, in [39] , the number of games is proportional to the number of decryption queries.
Then, we show three concrete instantiations using number theoretic assumptions in bilinear groups. The first one uses groups whose order is a product of two primes (whereas three primes are needed in [39] ). Our second and third schemes rely on the Groth-Sahai proof systems [31] in their instantiations based on the Decision Linear [9] and symmetric eXternal Diffie-Hellman assumptions [47] . The latter two constructions operate over bilinear groups of prime order, which allows for a significantly better efficiency than composite order groups (as discussed in [28] ) and makes them much easier to combine with known adaptively secure discrete-log-based distributed key generation protocols. For example, in the erasure-free setting, the protocols of [34, 2] can be used so as to eliminate the need for a trusted dealer at the same time as the reliance on reliable erasures.
Background and Definitions

Definitions for Threshold Public Key Encryption
A non-interactive (t, n)-threshold encryption scheme is a set of algorithms with these specifications.
Setup(λ, t, n): given a security parameter λ and integers t, n ∈ poly(λ) (with 1 ≤ t ≤ n) denoting the number of decryption servers n and the decryption threshold t, this algorithm outputs (P K, VK, SK), where P K is the public key, SK = (SK 1 , . . . , SK n ) is a vector of private-key shares and VK = (V K 1 , . . . , V K n ) is a vector of verification keys. Decryption server i is given the private key share (i, SK i ). For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the verification key V K i will be used to check the validity of decryption shares generated using SK i . Encrypt(P K, M ): is a randomized algorithm that, given a public key P K and a plaintext M , outputs a ciphertext C. Ciphertext-Verify(P K, C): takes as input a public key P K and a ciphertext C. It outputs 1 if C is deemed valid w.r.t. P K and 0 otherwise. Share-Decrypt(P K, i, SK i , C): on input of a public key P K, a ciphertext C and a privatekey share (i, SK i ), this (possibly randomized) algorithm outputs a special symbol (i, ⊥) if Ciphertext-Verify(P K, C) = 0. Otherwise, it outputs a decryption share µ i = (i,μ i ). Share-Verify(P K, V K i , C, µ i ): takes in P K, the verification key V K i , a ciphertext C and a purported decryption share µ i = (i,μ i ). It outputs either 1 or 0. In the former case, µ i is said to be a valid decryption share. We adopt the convention that (i, ⊥) is an invalid decryption share. Combine(P K, VK, C, {µ i } i∈S ): given P K, VK, C and a subset S ⊂ {1, . . . , n} of size t = |S| with decryption shares {µ i } i∈S , this algorithm outputs either a plaintext M or ⊥ if the set contains invalid decryption shares.
Chosen-ciphertext security. We use a game-based definition of chosen-ciphertext security which is akin to the one of [49, 8] with the difference that the adversary can adaptively decide which parties it wants to corrupt.
Definition 1.
A non-interactive (t, n)-Threshold Public Key Encryption scheme is secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks (or IND-CCA2 secure) and adaptive corruptions if no PPT adversary has non-negligible advantage in this game:
1. The challenger runs Setup(λ, t, n) to obtain a public key P K, a vector of private key shares SK = (SK 1 , . . . , SK n ) and verification keys VK = (V K 1 , . . . , V K n ). It gives P K and VK to the adversary A and keeps SK to itself.
2 The adversary A adaptively makes the following kinds of queries:
-Corruption query: A chooses i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and obtains SK i . No more than t − 1 private key shares can be obtained by A in the whole game. -Decryption query: A chooses an index i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and a ciphertext C. The challenger replies with µ i = Share-Decrypt(P K, i, SK i , C).
3. The adversary A chooses two equal-length messages M 0 , M 1 and obtains C = Encrypt(P K, M β ) for some random bit β R ← {0, 1}.
4.
A makes further queries as in step 2 but is not allowed to make decryption queries on C .
5.
A outputs a bit β and is deemed successful if β = β. As usual, A's advantage is measured as the distance
Consistency. A (t, n)-Threshold Encryption scheme provides decryption consistency if no PPT adversary has non-negligible advantage in a three-stage game where stages 1 and 2 are identical to those of Definition 1 with the difference that the adversary A is allowed to obtain all private key shares (alternatively, A can directly obtain SK at the beginning of the game). In stage 3, A outputs a ciphertext C and two t-sets of decryption shares Γ = {µ 1 , . . . , µ t } and Γ = {µ 1 , . . . , µ t }. The adversary A is declared successful if
2. Γ and Γ only consist of valid decryption shares.
We note that condition 1 prevents an adversary from trivially winning by outputting an invalid ciphertext, for which distinct sets of key shares may give different results. This definition of consistency is identical to the one of [49, 8] with the difference that A can adaptively corrupt servers.
Hardness Assumptions in Composite Order Groups
In one occasion, we appeal to groups (G, G T ) of order N = p 1 p 2 , where p 1 and p 2 are primes, with a bilinear map e : G × G → G T (i.e., for which e(g a , h b ) = e(g, h) ab for any g, h ∈ G and a, b ∈ Z N ). In the notations hereafter, for each i ∈ {1, 2}, G p i stands for the subgroup of order p i in G.
Definition 2 ([11]
). In a group G of composite order N , the Subgroup Decision (SD) problem is given (g ∈ G p 1 , h ∈ G) and η, to decide whether η ∈ G p 1 or η ∈ R G. The Subgroup Decision assumption states that, for any PPT distinguisher D, the SD problem is infeasible.
Assumptions in Prime Order Groups
We also use bilinear maps e : G ×Ĝ → G T over groups of prime order p. We will work in symmetric pairing configurations, where G =Ĝ, and sometimes in asymmetric configurations, where G =Ĝ. In the symmetric setting (G, G T ), we rely on the following assumption.
Definition 3 ([9]
). In a group G of prime order p, the Decision Linear Problem (DLIN) is to distinguish the distributions (g,
The Decision Linear Assumption is the intractability of DLIN for any PPT distinguisher D.
The problem amounts to deciding if vectors
In asymmetric bilinear groups (G,Ĝ, G T ), we assume the hardness of the Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem in G andĜ. This implies the unavailability of efficiently computable isomorphisms betweenĜ and G. This assumption is called Symmetric eXternal Diffie-Hellman (SXDH) assumption. Given vectors u 1 = (g, h), u 2 = (g a , h c ) in G 2 orĜ 2 , the SXDH assumption asserts the infeasibility of deciding whether u 1 and u 2 are linearly dependent (i.e., whether a = c mod p).
3 All-But-One Perfectly Sound Threshold Hash Proof Systems Let C, K and K be sets and let V ⊂ C be a subset. Let also R be a space where random coins can be chosen. We mandate that V, K, K and R be of exponential size in λ, where λ ∈ N is a security parameter. In addition, C, V and C\V should be efficiently samplable and we also require the set K to form a group for some binary operation, which is denoted by hereafter.
An all-but-one perfectly sound threshold hash proof system for the sets (C, V, K, K , R) is a tuple (SetupSound, SetupABO, Sample, Prove, SimProve, Verify, PubEval, SharePrivEval, ShareEvalVerify, Combine) of efficient algorithms with the following specifications.
SetupSound(λ, t, n): given a security parameter λ ∈ N and integers t, n ∈ poly(λ), this algorithm outputs a public key pk, n private key shares (sk 1 , . . . , sk n ) and verification keys (vk 1 , . . . , vk n ). SetupABO(λ, t, n, tag ): takes as input a security parameter λ ∈ N, integers t, n ∈ poly(λ) and a tag tag . It outputs a public key pk, n private key shares (sk 1 , . . . , sk n ), the corresponding verification keys (vk 1 , . . . , vk n ) as well as a simulation trapdoor τ . It is important that τ be independent of {sk i } n i=1 . Sample(pk): is a probabilistic algorithm that takes as input a public key pk. It draws random coins r R ← R and outputs an element Φ ∈ V along with the random coins r that will serve as a witness explaining Φ as an element of V. Prove(pk, tag, r, Φ): takes in a public key pk, a tag tag, an element Φ ∈ V and the random coins r ∈ R that were used to sample Φ. It generates a non-interactive proof π V that Φ ∈ V. SimProve(pk, τ, tag, Φ): takes as input a public key pk and a simulation trapdoor τ produced by SetupABO(λ, t, n, tag ), a tag tag and an element Φ ∈ C. If tag = tag , the algorithm outputs ⊥. If tag = tag , the algorithm produces a simulated NIZK proof π V that Φ ∈ V. Verify(pk, tag, Φ, π V ): takes as input a public key pk, a tag tag, an element Φ ∈ C and a purported proof π V . It outputs 1 if and only if π V is deemed as a valid proof that Φ ∈ V ⊂ C. PubEval(pk, r, Φ): takes as input a public key pk, an element Φ ∈ V and the random coins r ∈ R R such that (r, Φ) ← Sample(pk). It outputs a value K ∈ K, which is called public evaluation of Φ. SharePrivEval(pk, sk i , Φ): is a deterministic algorithm that takes in a public key pk, a private key share sk i and an element Φ ∈ C. It outputs a value K i ∈ K , called private evaluation share and a proof π K i that K i was evaluated correctly.
given a public key pk, a verification key vk i , an element Φ ∈ C, a private evaluation share K i ∈ K and its proof π K i , this algorithm outputs 1 if π K i is considered as a valid proof of the correct evaluation of K i . Otherwise, it outputs 0. Combine(pk, Φ, {(K i , π K i )} i∈S ): takes as input a public key pk, an element Φ ∈ C and a set of t pairs {(K i , π K i )} i∈S , where S ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, each one of which consists of a private evaluation share K i ∈ K and its proof
We also define this algorithm which is implied by the above ones but will be convenient to use.
PrivEval(pk, {sk i } i∈S , Φ): given a public key pk, a set of private key shares {sk i } i∈S where S is an arbitrary t-subset of {1, . . . , n}, and an element Φ ∈ C, this algorithm outputs the result of
The following properties are required from these algorithms and the sets (C, V, K, K , R).
(Setup indistinguishability): For any integers (λ, t, n) such that 1 ≤ t ≤ n and any tag tag , the output of SetupSound(λ, t, n) and the outputs (pk,
(Correctness and Public Evaluability on V): For any (pk,
R ← Sample(pk) (and thus Φ ∈ V), it holds that:
, then the private evaluation share K i ∈ K is uniquely determined by (pk, vk i ) and Φ. Moreover, the proof π K i satisfies the verification test:
2. For any t-subset S ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, combining the corresponding private evaluation shares allows recomputing the public evaluation:
PubEval(pk, r, Φ) = PrivEval(pk, {sk i } i∈S , Φ).
) produced by SetupSound or SetupABO and any Φ ∈ C\V, for any subsetS ⊂ {1, . . . , n} of size |S| = t − 1, the statistical distance
(All-But-One Soundness): For all integers (λ, t, n) such that 1 ≤ t ≤ n, any tag tag and any outputs (pk,
, τ ) of SetupABO(λ, t, n, tag ), these conditions are satisfied. 1. For any tag = tag , proofs are always perfectly sound. Namely, if a proof π V satisfies Verify(pk, tag, Φ, π V ) = 1 for some Φ ∈ C, then it necessarily holds that Φ ∈ V.
2. For any Φ ∈ C, the trapdoor τ allows simulating a proof π V ← SimProve(pk, τ, tag , Φ) such that Verify(pk, tag , Φ, π V ) = 1 (note that π V is a proof for a false statement if Φ ∈ C\V). Moreover, if Φ ∈ V, the simulated proof π V should be perfectly indistinguishable from a real proof (i.e., that would be generated by Prove using a witness r ∈ R of the fact that Φ ∈ V).
(Simulatability of Share Proofs): For all integers (λ, t, n) such that 1 ≤ t ≤ n, any tag tag , any outputs (pk,
, τ ) of SetupABO(λ, t, n, tag ) and any Φ ∈ C, the proofs π K i produced by (K i , π K i ) ← SharePrivEval(pk, sk i , Φ) should be simulatable using the trapdoor τ instead of {sk i } n i=1 . Using τ and public values (pk, {vk i } n i=1 , Φ), an efficient algorithm S should be able to produce simulated proofs π K i that are perfectly indistinguishable from real proofs.
), it should be computationally infeasible to come up with a triple (tag, Φ, π V ) as well as two distinct t-sets Γ = {(
: membership in C should be easy to check but membership in V should not. Moreover, this should hold even if τ is given. Namely, for all integers (λ, t, n) such that 1 ≤ t ≤ n, any tag tag and any outputs (pk,
, τ ) of SetupABO(λ, t, n, tag ), for any PPT distinguisher D, it must hold that:
In the definition of the subset membership hardness property, the trapdoor τ should not carry any side information helping the distinguisher. For this reason, the latter receives τ as part of its input.
4 Adaptively Secure Robust Non-Interactive CCA2-Secure Threshold Cryptosystems from All-But-One Perfectly Sound Threshold Hash Proof Systems
Let Π ABO-THPS = (SetupSound, SetupABO, Sample, Prove, SimProve, Verify, PubEval, SharePrivEval, ShareEvalVerify, Combine) be an all-but-one perfectly sound threshold hash proof system for sets (C, V, K, K , R) that satisfy the conditions specified in Section 3. We assume that messages are in K. The generic construction of CCA2-secure threshold cryptosystem goes as follows.
Keygen(λ, t, n): given integers λ, t, n ∈ N, choose a one-time signature scheme Σ = (Gen, Sig, Ver),
) ← SetupSound(λ, t, n) and output (P K, SK, VK), where the vectors of private key shares and verification keys are defined as SK = (sk 1 , . . . , sk n ) and VK = (vk 1 , . . . , vk n ), respectively. The public key is P K = (pk, Σ).
Encrypt(M, P K): to encrypt a message M ∈ K using P K = (pk, Σ), 1. Generate a one-time signature key pair (SSK, SVK) ← Σ.Gen(λ). 2. Choose r R ← R, compute (r, Φ) ← Sample(pk, r) as well as C 0 = M PubEval(pk, r, Φ). 3. Generate a proof π V ← Prove(pk, SVK, r, Φ) that Φ ∈ V with respect to the tag SVK.
given the private key share
If the decryption shareμ i is such thatμ i = ⊥ or if it cannot be properly parsed as a pair (
In any other situation, return 0.
We observe that there is no need to bind the one-time verification key SVK to the ciphertext components (C 0 , Φ, π V ) in any other way than by using it as a tag to compute the non-interactive proof π V . Indeed, if the adversary attempts to re-use parts (C 0 , Φ , π V ) of the challenge ciphertext and simply replaces the one-time verification key SVK by a verification key SVK of its own, it will be forced to compute a proof π V that correspond to the same Φ as in the challenge phase but under the new tag SVK. Our security proof shows that this is infeasible as long as Π ABO-THPS satisfies the properties of setup indistinguishability and all-but-one soundness.
The consistency property of the scheme is trivially implied by that of Π ABO-THPS and we focus on proving its IND-CCA security. In the threshold setting, adaptive security is achieved by taking advantage of the fact that, in security reductions using hash proof systems, the simulator typically knows the private key and can thus answer adaptive queries at will. At the same time, invalid ciphertexts are harmless as they are made publicly recognizable due to the use of non-interactive proofs of validity: as long as these proofs are perfectly sound in all decryption queries, the simulator is guaranteed not to leak too much information about the particular private key it is using.
The main problem to solve is thus to make sure that only the simulator can simulate a fake proof in the challenge phase and this is where the all-but-one soundness property is handy. Theorem 1. The above threshold cryptosystem is IND-CCA secure against adaptive corruptions assuming that: (i) Π ABO-THPS is an all-but-one perfectly sound hash proof system; (ii) Σ is a strongly unforgeable one-time signature.
Proof. The proof uses of a sequence of games starting with the real attack game and ending with a game where the adversary A has no advantage. For each i, S i is the event that A wins in Game i .
Game 1 : is the real attack game. In details, the adversary is given the public key P K and the set of verification keys VK = (vk 1 , . . . , vk n ) and starts making adaptive queries. At each corruption query i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the challenger B reveals the queried private key share SK i = sk i and, at each decryption query, B runs the real shared decryption algorithm. In the challenge phase, the adversary A chooses messages M 0 , M 1 ∈ K and obtains C = (SVK , C 0 , Φ , π V , σ ) which is an encryption of M β , for some random coin β R ← {0, 1} internally flipped by B. For simplicity, we assume that the one-time signature key pair (SSK , SVK ) is chosen by B at the outset of the game. In the second phase, A makes more queries under the restriction of not asking for a partial decryption of C or for more than t − 1 private key shares throughout the entire game. Eventually, A halts and outputs β . We denote by S 1 the event that β = β . Game 2 : we change the distribution of the public key P K = (pk, Σ). Namely, instead of generating (pk,
) as in Game 1 . We note that, after this change, the one-time verification key SVK may not be completely independent of A's view before the challenge phase. However, due to the setup indistinguishability property of Π ABO-THPS , this modification cannot significantly affect A's behavior. This implies |Pr[S 2 ] − Pr[S 1 ]| ∈ negl(λ). Game 3 : we introduce a failure event F 3 and let the challenger B halt and output a random bit if this event occurs. We call F 3 the event that A makes a decryption query involving a valid ciphertext C = (SVK, C 0 , Φ, π V , σ) such that SVK = SVK . We note that Game 3 and Game 2 are identical until F 3 occurs and argue that |Pr[
occurs before the challenge phase, it means that A was able to forge a valid one-time signature even before seeing a signature. If F 3 comes about in a post-challenge query, A must have been able to break the strong unforgeability of the one-time signature. Game 4 : we modify the generation of the challenge ciphertext C . Namely, the challenger still picks Φ ∈ V as per (r , Φ ) ← Sample(pk), using random coins r R ← R, as in previous games. However, C 0 is now computed as
As long as Π ABO-THPS satisfies the property of correctness and public evaluability on V, A's view does not change since C 0 has the same distribution either way. We thus have Pr[
Game 5 : we modify again the generation of the challenge ciphertext C . We observe that the proof π V must be generated w.r.t. the tag SVK which, due to the modification introduced in Game 2 , is the tag for which B can generate simulated NIZK proofs using the trapdoor τ . To construct the ciphertext C , the challenger B chooses Φ ∈ V as in Game 4 and sets
Note that, with this modification, π V is now independent of {sk i } n i=1 as these are independent of τ . Since (C 0 , Φ , π V ) have the same distribution as in Game 4 , we have Pr[S 5 ] = Pr[S 4 ]. Game 6 : is as Game 5 but we change the treatment of decryption queries C = (SVK, C 0 , Φ, π V , σ).
More precisely, whenever B runs SharePrivEval(pk, sk i , Φ) in order to answer decryption queries, to obtain a private evaluation share K i and a proof π K i of its validity, the latter is generated using the simulator S and the simulation trapdoor τ instead of the private key share sk i . The property that we called "simulatability of share proofs" guarantees the existence of such an efficient simulator S and that simulated proofs π K i will be distributed as real proofs. Hence, we can write Pr[S 6 ] = Pr[S 5 ]. Game 7 : we bring one last change in the generation of the challenge ciphertext. Instead of computing (C 0 , π V ) as per (1) using a random Φ ∈ V, the value Φ is randomly chosen in C\V. Under the subset membership hardness assumption in (C, V), this modification cannot be noticed by A and we must have |Pr[
In Game 7 , we have Pr[S 7 ] ≈ 1/2 so that A's advantage is statistically negligible. To see this, we observe that, for any valid decryption query C = (SVK, C 0 , Φ, π V , σ) such that SVK = SVK , the proof π V is perfectly sound since it is generated for a tag SVK = SVK and this guarantees that Φ ∈ V (as even an unbounded A would be unable to generate a convincing proof π V otherwise). Consequently, for each revealed decryption shareμ i = (i, (K i , π K i )), it holds that: (1) K i does not reveal any more information about sk i than (pk, vk i ) since it is uniquely determined by (pk, vk i , Φ); (2) the distribution of π K i does not depend on sk i thanks to the modification introduced in Game 6 .
The universality property of Π ABO-THPS tells us that, for any (t − 1)-subsetS ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, the distribution pk,
In other words, C 0 statistically hides M β and Pr [S 7 ] is negligibly far apart from 1/2, as claimed.
Instantiations
Construction in Groups of Composite Order
The construction relies on a hash proof system in a group G of composite order N = p 1 p 2 and it is conceptually close to the one in [33] (notably because it builds on a log p 2 -entropic hash proof system, as defined in [37] ). The public key includes group elements (g, X = g x ) in the subgroup G p 1 of order p 1 and the sets C and V are defined to be G and G p 1 , respectively. The sampling algorithm returns Φ = g r ∈ G p 1 for a randomly chosen exponent r R ← Z N , which allows publicly evaluating H(X r ) = H(Φ x ) using a pairwise independent hash function H : G → {0, 1} . Since the public key is independent of x mod p 2 , for any Φ ∈ G that has a non-trivial component of order p 2 , the "hash value" Φ x has exactly log p 2 bits of min-entropy and the leftover hash lemma implies that H(Φ x ) is statistically close to the uniform distribution in {0, 1} when is sufficiently small.
In order to turn the scheme into an all-but-one perfectly sound threshold HPS, we need a mechanism that proves membership in the subgroup G p 1 and guarantees the perfect soundness of proofs of membership for all tags tag ∈ Z N such that tag = tag . To this end, we use additional public parameters (u, v) ∈ G 2 and a tag-dependent group element u tag · v will serve as a common reference string to generate a non-interactive proof that Φ ∈ G p 1 . Membership in G p 1 can be noninteractively proved using a technique that can be traced back to [30] . The proof consists of a group element π SD ∈ G satisfying the equality e(Φ, u tag · v) = e(g, π SD ), which ensures that Φ ∈ G p 1 as long as u tag · v has a G p 2 component. In the public parameters produced by SetupABO, the value u tag · v thus has to be in G\G p 1 for any tag = tag in such a way that generating fake proofs that Φ ∈ G p 1 is impossible. At the same time, u tag · v should be in G p 1 so that fake proofs can be generated for tag .
SetupSound(λ, t, n): choose a group G of composite order N = p 1 p 2 for large primes p i > 2 l(λ) for each i ∈ {1, 2} and for some polynomial l : N → N. Then, conduct the following steps
. Select a pairwise independent hash function H : G → {0, 1} , where ≤ l(λ) − 2λ. Note that the range K = {0, 1} of H forms a group for the bitwise exclusive OR operation = ⊕. 4. Define private key shares (sk 1 , . . . , sk n ) as sk i = P (i) ∈ Z N for each i = 1 to n. The vector (vk 1 , . . . , vk n ) is defined as vk i = Y i ∈ G p 1 for each i and the public key consists of pk = (G, G T ), N, g, X, u, v, H . In addition, we have (
SetupABO(λ, t, n, tag ): is identical to SetupSound with the difference that, instead of being chosen uniformly in G, v is defined as v = u −tag · g α for some random α R ← Z N . The algorithm also outputs the simulation trapdoor τ = α ∈ Z N . Sample(pk): parse pk as (G, G T ), N, g, X, u, v, H . Choose r R ← Z N , compute Φ = g r ∈ G p 1 and output the pair (r, Φ) ∈ Z N × G p 1 . Prove(pk, tag, r, Φ): parse pk as (G, G T ), N, g, X, u, v, H and return ⊥ if Φ = g r . Otherwise, compute and return π SD = (u tag · v) r . SimProve(pk, τ, tag, Φ): return ⊥ if tag = tag or if Φ ∈ G. Otherwise, use the simulation trapdoor τ = α ∈ Z N to compute and output π SD = Φ α . Verify(pk, tag, Φ, π SD ): return 1 if and only if (Φ, π SD ) ∈ G 2 and e(Φ, u tag · v) = e(g, π SD ). PubEval(pk, r, Φ): on input of pk = (G, G T ), N, g, X, u, v, H , return ⊥ if (r, Φ) ∈ Z N × G. Otherwise, compute and return K = H(X r ) ∈ {0, 1} . SharePrivEval(pk, sk i , Φ): return ⊥ if Φ ∈ G. Otherwise, compute and return (K i , π K i ), where K i = Φ sk i = Φ P (i) and π K i = ε is simply the empty string.
if e(g, K i ) = e(Φ, vk i ). In any other situation, return 0 (the proof π K i is completely ignored in this instantiation since, given vk i = Y i , the private evaluation share K i is directly verifiable).
Theorem 2. The above construction is an all-but-one perfectly sound threshold hash proof system if the SD assumption holds in G. (The proof is given in appendix C.1).
When the above all-but-one perfectly sound threshold hash proof system is plugged into the generic construction of Section 4, the resulting threshold cryptosystem bears resemblance with the scheme in [39] , which makes use of groups whose order is a product of three primes. However, it is more efficient and its security proof is completely different as the dual system encryption approach [50] is not used here.
Construction from the Decision Linear Assumption in Prime Order Groups
This section presents an all-but-one threshold hash proof system based on the DLIN assumption in prime order bilinear groups. The public key comprises elements (g, g 1 , g 2 , X 1 , X 2 ) ∈ G 5 , where
2 · g z and (x 1 , x 2 , z) are part of the private key. The sets C and V ⊂ C consist of C = G 3 and
2 , which can be privately evaluated as Φ
2 · Φ z 3 . As in the previous instantiation, we append to elements Φ ∈ V a non-interactive proof of their membership of V (i.e., a proof that (g, g 1 , g 2 , Φ 1 , Φ 2 , Φ 3 ) is a linear tuple) and, in this case, the proof is obtained using the Groth-Sahai techniques (which are recalled in appendix B). However, we cannot simply combine them with a DLIN-based hash proof system in the obvious way. The reason is that, using parameters produced by SetupABO and under the special tag tag , SimProve must be able to compute a fake non-interactive proof of the statement Φ ∈ V for an element Φ ∈ V. At the same time, we should make sure that, for any tag such that tag = tag , it will be impossible to simulate such proofs. To solve this problem, we need a form of one-time simulation soundness [46] which can be possibly obtained from Groth's simulation-sound non-interactive proofs [29] or a more efficient variant suggested by Katz and Vaikuntanathan [35] . However, the specific language that we consider allows for even more efficient constructions: it is actually possible to build on the Groth-Sahai proofs essentially without any loss of efficiency.
The solution is as follows. After having sampled a linear tuple Φ = (Φ 1 , Φ 2 , Φ 3 ) ∈ V, the sampler generates his proof using a Groth-Sahai CRS that depends on tag. Algorithm SetupABO produces parameters in the fashion of the all-but-one technique [7] : the tag-based CRS is perfectly WI on the special tag tag (which allows generating NIZK proofs for this tag) and perfectly sound for any other tag, which makes it impossible to convincingly prove false statements on tags tag = tag . Malkin, Teranishi, Vahlis and Yung [42] used a similar idea of message-dependent CRS in the context of signatures. A difference with [42] is that we do not need to extract witnesses from adversariallygenerated proofs and only use them as proofs of membership.
Interestingly, the same technique can be applied to have a more efficient simulation-sound proof of plaintext equality in the Naor-Yung-type [43] cryptosystem in [35] [Section 3.2.2]: the proof can be reduced from 60 to 22 group elements and the ciphertext size is decreased by more than 50%.
SetupSound(λ, t, n): Choose a group G of prime order p > 2 λ with generators g, g 1 , 1, g ).
Choose random polynomials
for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and the public key is defined to be
As for the sets (C, K, K , R), they are defined as C = G 3 , K = K = G and R = (Z p ) 2 , respectively. The subset V ⊂ C consists of the language (Φ 1 , Φ 2 , Φ 3 ) ∈ G 3 for which there
and Φ 3 = g θ 1 +θ 2 . SetupABO(λ, t, n, tag ): is identical to SetupSound with the following differences.
1. In step 1, g 3 is set as
2. In step 2, the vectors ( f 1 , f 2 , f 3 ) are chosen so as to have
3. The algorithm additionally outputs the trapdoor τ = (ξ 1 , ξ 2 , φ 1 , φ 2 ) ∈ (Z p ) 4 .
, g θ 1 +θ 2 ) and output (θ 1 , θ 2 ), Φ . Prove pk, tag, (θ 1 , θ 2 ), Φ : parse pk as (G, G T ), g, g 1 , g 2 , g 3 , f 1 , f 2 , f 3 , X 1 , X 2 and Φ as (Φ 1 , Φ 2 , Φ 3 ) .
Construct 1 a vector g tag = g 3 · (1, 1, g ) tag and use g tag = ( g 1 , g 2 , g tag ) as a Groth-Sahai CRS to generate a NIZK proof that (g, g 1 , g 2 , Φ 1 , Φ 2 , Φ 3 ) is a linear tuple. More precisely, generate commitments C θ 1 , C θ 2 to exponents θ 1 , θ 2 ∈ Z p (in other words, compute
with r i , s i R ← Z p for each i ∈ {1, 2}) and a proof π (θ 1 ,θ 2 ) that they satisfy
The whole proof π LIN for (2) consists of C θ 1 , C θ 2 and π (θ 1 ,θ 2 ) (see appendix E.1 for details about the generation of this proof) and requires 12 elements of G. SimProve(pk, τ, tag, Φ): parses pk as above, τ as (
If tag = tag , return ⊥. Otherwise, the commitments C θ 1 , C θ 2 and the proof π LIN must be generated for the CRS g tag = ( g 1 , g 2 , g tag ), where
, which is a Groth-Sahai CRS for the witness indistinguishability setting (as recalled in appendix B).
1. Using the trapdoor (ξ 1 , ξ 2 ), simulate proofs for multi-exponentiation equations (see appendix E.1 for details as to how such proofs can be simulated). That is, generate C θ 1 , C θ 2 as commitments to 0 and compute π (θ 1 ,θ 2 ) as a simulated proof that relations (2) hold. θ 2 ) ) that consists of perfectly hiding commitments and simulated NIZK proofs which, on the CRS ( g 1 , g 2 , g tag ), are distributed as real proofs.
Verify(pk, tag, Φ, π LIN ): parse pk and Φ as above and π LIN as ( θ 2 ) ) ∈ G 12 . Then, compute g tag = g 3 · (1, 1, g) tag and use g tag = ( g 1 , g 2 , g tag ) as a Groth-Sahai CRS to verify the proof π LIN . If the latter is deemed as a valid proof for the relations (2), return 1. Otherwise, return 0.
PubEval pk, (θ 1 , θ 2 ), Φ : parse pk and Φ as above.
, g θ 1 +θ 2 ). Otherwise, compute and return
erwise, compute and return a pair (K i , π K i ), where
is a proof consisting of commitments C P 1 , C P 2 , C P to exponents P 1 (i), P 2 (i), P (i) ∈ Z p and a proof π K i that these satisfy the equations
The perfectly binding commitments C P 1 , C P 2 , C P and the proof π K i are generated using the vectors f = ( f 1 , f 2 , f 3 ) as a Groth-Sahai CRS (in such a way that C P 1 = f 3
for some r P 1 , s P 1 R ← Z p , for example). 1 We assume that tags are non-zero. This can be enforced by having Prove and Verify output ⊥ when tag = 0.
and return 1 if π K i is a valid proof for equations (3) . In any other situation, return 0.
Theorem 3. The above construction is an all-but-one perfectly sound threshold hash proof system assuming that the DLIN assumption holds in G. (The proof is given in appendix C.2.)
The proof π LIN takes 6 group elements whereas commitments C θ 1 , C θ 2 require 3 group elements each. If the scheme is instantiated using Groth's one-time signature [29] (which relies on the discrete logarithm assumption), SVK and σ demand 3 and 2 group elements, respectively. The whole ciphertext C thus consists of 21 group elements. Concretely, if each element has a representation of 512 bits, at the 128-bit security level, the ciphertext overhead amounts to 10240 bits.
From a computational standpoint, assuming that a multi-exponentiation with two base elements has roughly the same cost as a single-base exponentiation, the sender has to compute 19 exponentiations in G (we include the cost of generating SVK which incurs three exponentiations in Groth's one-time signature [29] ). As for the verifier's workload, the validity of a ciphertext can be checked by computing a product of 12 pairings (which is significantly more efficient than naively evaluating 12 individual pairings) using probabilistic batch verification techniques as in [6] .
In appendix D, we show an even more efficient instantiation based on the Symmetric eXternal Diffie-Hellman assumption in prime order groups: only 6 pairing evaluations suffice to check π V .
) is a Boneh-BoyenShacham (BBS) encryption [9] that can be decrypted using α 1 = log g (g 1 ), α 2 = log g (g 2 ). In the witness indistinguishability (WI) setting, g 1 , g 2 , g 3 are linearly independent and C is a perfectly hiding commitment. Under the DLIN assumption, the two settings are indistinguishable.
To commit to an exponent x ∈ Z p , one computes C = ϕ x · g 1 r · g 2 s , with r, s R ← Z * p , using a CRS comprising vectors ϕ, g 1 , g 2 . In the soundness setting ϕ, g 1 , g 2 are linearly independent vectors (typically, one chooses ϕ = g 3 · (1, 1, g ) where g 3 = g 1 ξ 1 · g 2 ξ 2 ) whereas, in the WI setting, choosing
gives a perfectly hiding commitment since C is always a BBS encryption of 1 G . On a perfectly sound CRS (where g 3 = g 1 ξ 1 · g 2 ξ 2 and ϕ = g 3 · (1, 1, g) ), commitments to exponents are not fully extractable since the trapdoor (α 1 , α 2 ) only allows recovering g x from C = ϕ x · g 1 r · g 2 s . To prove that committed variables satisfy certain relations, the techniques of [31] require one commitment per variable and one proof element per relation. Such efficient proofs notably exist for multi-exponentiation equations which are equations of the form
for variables X 1 , . . . , X n ∈ G, y 1 , . . . , y m ∈ Z p and constants T, A 1 , . . . , A m ∈ G, b 1 , . . . , b n ∈ Z p and γ ij ∈ G, for i ∈ {1, . . . , m}, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Multi-exponentiation equations admit zero-knowledge proofs at no additional cost. On a simulated CRS (prepared for the WI setting), the trapdoor (ξ 1 , ξ 2 ) makes it possible to simulate proofs without knowing witnesses, and simulated proofs are perfectly indistinguishable from real proofs.
For linear equations (i.e., when γ ij = 0 for all i, j) depends on the form of the considered equation. Namely, linear multi-exponentiation equations of the type
The Groth-Sahai techniques can also be instantiated in groups (G,Ĝ, G T ) with an asymmetric bilinear map e : G ×Ĝ → G T , where G =Ĝ. In this case, they rely on the Symmetric eXternal Diffie-Hellman assumption according to which the DDH problem is hard in both G andĜ. In this setting, we only use them to prove multi-exponentiation equations of the form i = T will be perfectly sound if u ∈ span( u 1 ) and perfectly WI if u ∈ span( u 1 ). In either case, the proof consists of a single element of G.
C Deferred Proofs
C.1 Proof of Theorem 2
The theorem is proved by demonstrating that, under the Subgroup Decision assumption, the scheme provides all the properties required from an all-but-one perfectly sound HPS.
The subset membership hardness property is straightforward as it is exactly the Subgroup Decision assumption in this instantiation. The simulatability of share proofs is also trivial to verify since no non-interactive proof is needed to check the validity of private evaluation shares. We thus focus on remaining properties.
To prove the universality property, we rely on the leftover hash lemma [32] .
Lemma 1. Let X ∈ X be a random variable such that H ∞ (X) ≥ k and let H be a family of pairwise independent hash functions with domain X and range {0, 1} . Then, if H R ← H, we have
where U denotes the uniform distribution over {0, 1} .
Setup Indistinguishability. The only difference between the outputs (pk,
) of SetupSound(λ, t, n) and SetupABO(λ, t, n, tag ) is the distribution of v ∈ G which is uniform in G in the former case and equals v = u −tag · g α , where α R ← Z N , when it is returned by SetupABO. In the latter situation, v can be seen a Boneh-Goh-Nissim encryption [11] of −tag whereas a uniformly random v ∈ R G can be interpreted as a BGN encryption of a random plaintext. Consequently, the public outputs of SetupSound and SetupABO cannot be told apart if the Subgroup Decision assumption (which is equivalent to the semantic security of the BGN cryptosystem) holds.
Correctness and Public Evaluability on V. Since the public values pk = g x and vk i = g P (i) uniquely determine P [X] mod p 1 as well as sk i mod p 1 , for any Φ ∈ G p 1 , there is only one possible value SharePrivEval(pk, sk i , Φ) = (K i , ε) = (Φ P (i) , ε). The second condition is immediate to verify.
Universality. Let Φ be a random element of order N in G . For any (t − 1)-subsetS ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, if we consider the min-entropy of Φ x given Φ, g x , {vk i = g P (i) } n i=1 and {sk i = P (i)} i∈S , we have
Lemma 1 tells us that the statistical distance
is smaller than 1/2 (log p 2 − )/2 < 1/2 (l(λ)− )/2 , which is negligible as long as l(λ) ≥ 2λ + .
All-But-One Soundness. Since SetupABO chooses u at random in G, u has a non-trivial G p 2 component with overwhelming probability. We know that u tag · v = u tag−tag · g α has a non-trivial G p 2 component whenever tag = tag . The equality e(Φ, u tag · v) = e(g, π SD ) -more precisely, the fact that its right-hand-side member has order p 1 -thus guarantees that Φ ∈ G p 1 as long as tag = tag . At the same time, u tag · v = g α has order p 1 , and the trapdoor allows simulating proofs that Φ ∈ G p 1 . When Φ is really in the subgroup G p 1 , π SD = Φ α equals the proof that would be produced using the real witness r = log g (Φ). When, Φ ∈ R G, π SD = Φ α still satisfies the equality e(Φ, u tag · v) = e(g, π SD ) and can thus serve as a simulated proof that Φ ∈ G p 1 .
Consistency. Let us assume that a PPT adversary A can break the consistency property of the all-but-one HPS with non-negligible probability. We show that A implies a distinguisher B for the Subgroup Decision assumption. The distinguisher B receives (g ∈ G p 1 , h ∈ G) and η ∈ G with the aim of deciding if η has a non-trivial G p 2 component. This is done by generating the public key pk using g ∈ G p 1 and h ∈ G and by choosing {(sk i , vk i )} n i=1 as in the specification of the scheme. The only way for the adversary to break the consistency property is to output (tag, Φ, π SD ) (note that Φ's membership in G p 1 is guaranteed by the perfectly sound proof π SD ) and two sets of decryption shares where at least one share is of the form K i = Φ P (i) · R 2,i , for some R 2,i ∈ G * p 2 . Since B knows sk i = P (i), it can compute R 2,i = K i /Φ P (i) ∈ G p 2 , which allows deciding whether η ∈ G p 1 by testing whether the equality e(η, R 2,i ) = 1 G T (which only holds if η ∈ G p 1 ) holds.
C.2 Proof of Theorem 3
We show that, under the Decision Linear assumption, the scheme meets all the requirements of all-but-one perfectly sound threshold HPS. The subset membership hardness property is trivially implied by the DLIN assumption and we thus focus on remaining properties.
Setup Indistinguishability. The difference between the public outputs of SetupSound(λ, t, n) and SetupABO(λ, t, n, tag ) is in the distributions of vectors g 3 and f 3 since SetupSound chooses g 3 in span( g 1 , g 2 ) and f 3 ∈ span( f 1 , f 2 ) whereas SetupABO proceeds the other way around.
We first prove the indistinguishability of the two possible distributions for g 3 (the case of f 3 can be handled in a completely analogous way). To this end, we define an intermediate setup procedure SetupInt which produces vectors of the form ( g 1 , g 2 , g 3 ) with g 1 = (g 1 , 1, g ), g 2 = (1, g 2 , g ),
The result is obtained by combining the following two claims, the proofs of which are straightforward but given for completeness. Proof. We show a distinguisher B that takes in (g, g 1 , g 2 , g
). As for g 3 , B defines it as g 3 = (g
as an output of SetupSound whereas, if χ ∈ R G, it is an output of SetupInt. Proof. Consider a distinguisher B that takes as input (g, g 1 , g 2 , g
, χ) and decides if χ = g δ 1 +δ 2 or χ ∈ R G. To do so, B defines g 1 = (g 1 , 1, g) and g 2 = (1, g 2 , g ). As for the third vector g 3 , B and computes g 3 = (g
. If χ ∈ R G, the vector g 3 has the same distribution no matter if χ is multiplied by g −tag or not and its distribution corresponds to that of an output of SetupInt. If χ = g δ 1 +δ 2 , g 3 is distributed as in parameters produced by SetupABO.
Correctness and Public Evaluability on V. This property is implied by the public evaluability of the underlying standard hash proof system. Namely, for any element Φ ∈ V, which is a triple of the form (
, g θ 1 +θ 2 and for each i, the value
i,2 and is uniquely defined by pk and vk i = (Y i,1 , Y i,2 ). It is also immediate that combining any t values
Universality. Let Φ = (Φ 1 , Φ 2 , Φ 3 ) be a random triple in G 3 . With overwhelming probability, we have Φ 3 = g θ 1 +θ 2 , where θ 1 = log g 1 (Φ 1 ) and θ 2 = log g 2 (Φ 2 ). For any (t − 1)-subsetS ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, given shares {sk i = (P 1 (i), P 2 (i), P (i))} i∈S and public elements X 1 = g
, the value z = P (0) is completely undetermined. Since Φ can be written (Φ 1 , Φ 2 , Φ 3 ) = (g θ 1 1 , g θ 2 2 , g θ 1 +θ 2 +θ ) for some non-zero θ ∈ R Z * p , its private evaluation can be expressed as
which is uniformly random since z is itself random and independent of publicly available elements.
All-But-One Soundness. Algorithm SetupABO chooses ( g 1 , g 2 , g 3 ) in such a way that, for any tag = tag , the vector g tag = g 3 · (1, 1, g) tag = g 1 ξ 1 · g 2 ξ 2 · (1, 1, g) tag−tag is not in span( g 1 , g 2 ) and ( g 1 , g 2 , g tag ) forms a Groth-Sahai CRS for the perfect soundness setting. Consequently, for any tag tag = tag , even an unbounded adversary would be unable to produce a convincing proof π LIN for an element Φ ∈ V. At the same time, g tag = g 1 ξ 1 · g 2 ξ 2 is such that ( g 1 , g 2 , g tag ) is a Groth-Sahai CRS for the perfect WI setting, and the trapdoor (ξ 1 , ξ 2 ) makes it possible to generate simulated proofs π LIN for elements Φ = (Φ 1 , Φ 2 , Φ 3 ) ∈ G 3 that can be outside the language V of linear tuples. Whenever (g, g 1 , g 2 , Φ 1 , Φ 2 , Φ 3 ) is actually a linear tuple, simulated proofs (see appendix E.1 for details on how to construct them) are distributed exactly as the proofs that would be produced using real witnesses.
Simulatability of Share Proofs. In the public parameters produced by SetupABO, the vectors f = ( f 1 , f 2 , f 3 ) are chosen in such a way that f 3 = f 1 φ 1 · f 2 φ 2 . This means that (φ 1 , φ 2 ) can be used as a trapdoor to generate simulated NIZK proofs π K i = ( C P 1 , C P 2 , C P , π K i ) that committed exponents (P 1 (i), P 2 (i), P (i)) satisfy the multi-exponentiation equations
Namely, C P 1 , C P 2 , C P are generated as commitments to 0 and the proof for (4) is simulated using (φ 1 , φ 2 ). The resulting proof π K i -which is a simulated proof for a true statement -has the same distribution as a real proof.
Consistency. This property holds unconditionally. This is implied by the perfect soundness of Groth-Sahai proofs. Namely, SetupSound produces common reference strings g tag = ( g 1 , g 2 , g tag ) and f = ( f 1 , f 2 , f 3 ) that are always perfectly sound. This guarantees the impossibility of producing a convincing proof π LIN for an element Φ = (Φ 1 , Φ 2 , Φ 3 ) such that (g, g 1 , g 2 , Φ 1 , Φ 2 , Φ 3 ) is not a linear tuple. Moreover, thanks to the perfect soundness of proofs π K i for the CRS f = ( f 1 , f 2 , f 3 ), invalid private evaluation shares K i can never be accepted by the ShareEvalVerify algorithm. Consequently, there is no way for two distinct sets of acceptable private evaluation shares to yield two distinct private evaluations for a valid Φ ∈ V.
D Instantiation from the SXDH Assumption in Prime Order Groups
The construction of Section 5.2 relies on a well-established assumption in prime order groups and it is described in terms of symmetric pairings for simplicity. However, it readily extends to asymmetric pairing configurations. Further efficiency improvements can be obtained if we choose to rely on asymmetric pairings e : G×Ĝ → G T and the Symmetric eXternal Diffie-Hellman assumption (SXDH), which posits that the DDH problem is hard in G andĜ when G =Ĝ and no isomorphism is efficiently computable between G andĜ.
In this case, the public key comprises group elements (g 1 , g 2 , X) ∈ G with X = g PubEval pk, (θ 1 , θ 2 ), Φ : parse pk and Φ as above. Return ⊥ if (Φ 1 , Φ 2 ) = (g θ 1 , g θ 2 ). Otherwise, compute and return K = X θ ∈ K. SharePrivEval(pk, sk i , Φ): parse sk i as (P 1 (i), P 2 (i)) ∈ (Z p ) 2 and return ⊥ if Φ ∈ G 2 . Otherwise, return (K i , π K i ), where K i = Φ On a CRS ( u tag , u 1 ) for the perfect WI setting (i.e., where u tag = u ρu 1 for some ρ u ∈ R Z p ), a NIZK proof π DH can be simulated by computing C θ as a commitment to 0 (say C θ = u r 1 for some r R ← Z p ) and the assignment
is easily seen to satisfy the verification equations (8) .
